We provide a shorter proof than Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) of the existence of equilibrium in an incomplete financial market economy with numeraire assets, under the weak assumption that asset returns are non-negative. Furthermore, we relax the strict monotonicity assumption on preferences and as an application we prove the existence of equilibrium when agents may disagree on zero probability events but do not plan to go bankrupt in any state.
Introduction
We prove a version of the theorem of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) on the existence of equilibrium in two-period exchange economies with incomplete, numeraire asset markets. By assuming non-negative asset return, we provide a shorter proof and, moreover, we relax the monotonicity assumption. In particular, one single agent with strictly monotone preferences would suffice. As an application, we show that with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, even if agents disagree on zero-probability events but do not plan to go bankrupt in any state, equilibrium still exists. Therefore, even with incomplete markets, in a two-period model with no bankruptcy, non-equivalent beliefs pose no problem for the existence of equilibrium.
The Model
The model is similar to that developed by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) . H = {0, 1, ..., H}, with H ∈ N, is a set of agents. S = {0, 1, ..., S}, with S ∈ N, is the set of possible future states of the world. L = {0, 1..., L} , with L ∈ N, is the set of commodities, so the consumption set is R (L+1)(S+1) + . Each agent h ∈ H is endowed with w h ∈ R (L+1)(S+1) +
. A = {0, 1, ..., A}, with A ∈ N, is the set of assets. The return of asset a ∈ A is the (column) vector v a ∈ R S which pays in units of the first commodity, l = 0 (the numeraire of the economy).
The matrix of asset returns is
A+1 , taken as a row vector. A portfolio is a (column)
and q ∈ R (A+1) denote commodity spot prices and asset prices, respectively.
Agent h has preferences represented by utility function W h : R (L+1)(S+1) + −→ R and, at prices (q, p) , faces the budget set
Agents maximize their utilities subject to their budget constraint. We interpret this model as one in which only assets are traded at time zero (t = 0) but consumption plans are made for time one (t = 1) in each state of nature that might occur in that period, s ∈ S. At time zero net expenditure in assets is zero and at time one agents receive an endowment in each state of nature that they can sell to finance consumption and net financial positions.
In what follows, 1 s,l is a vector in R (L+1)(S+1) that contains 0 everywhere, except in the component (s, l), where it is 1.
We will use the following assumptions.
Condition 1 For each h, W h is continuous and quasiconcave on R
Condition 4 ∀s ∈ S, ∃h ∈ H such that for all x ∈ R (S+1)(L+1) + and ε > 0,
Remark 1 Condition 4 is considerably weaker than Condition (A3) in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) : there, Condition (A3) requires that every agent strictly prefer more of the numeraire in each state. Here, Condition 4 requires that, in any state, there be at least one agent that strictly prefers more of the numeraire in that state. In particular, one single agent with strictly monotonic preferences, as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) , would imply Condition 4.
For normalized prices of assets and commodities, define Q = {q ∈ R
Our equilibrium concept is:
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium with a numeraire financial structure V is a 4-tuple of asset prices, commodity prices, asset allocations and commodity
Remark 2 Condition 3 implies little loss of generality, for it suffices that just one asset with strictly positive payoffs (for instance a riskless bond) be available in the economy. That is, consider a financial structureṼ = ṽ 0ṽ1 ...ṽ A such thatṽ 0 0 (but which may violate Condition 3). Find a scalar k such that v a + kṽ 0 ≥ 0 for each a = 1, ..., A, and construct an alternative financial structure
It is immediate that structure V satisfies Condition 3, and it follows by construction and definition that the economy has a competitive equilibrium (q * , p * , x * , y * ) with
For completeness, we include the following.
be a compact rectangle with center at the origin. For each individual h ∈ H, consider the truncated individual demand correspondence
, with q = 0 and p s = 0 for all s.
Proof (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986) . By continuity and compactness, f h (q, p; K) is nonempty and compact, and by quasiconcavity of W h and the convexity of the budget set, it is convex.
To show upper hemicontinuity at each (q,
with q = 0 and p s = 0 for all s, let (q n , p n )
. By continuity, for λ < 1 but close enough to 1, we have W h (λx) > W h (x); and, again by continuity, for large enough
Let y n = arg min { y − y : y · q n = 0}. Then by the Theorem of the Maximum, since q = 0, then q n → q implies that y n → y. We know that (y, x) ∈ B (q, p; K) . Since ∀s ∈ S, p s ·w h s ∈ R ++ , it is easy to see that for λ < 1, but close to 1, p s · λx s − w h s < p s,0 (v s · λy) and (λy, λx) ∈ K. Since (q n(k) , p n(k) ) → (q, p) and y n(k) → y then, for large k, we have p n(k),s · λx s − w h s < p n(k),s,0 v s · λy n(k) and λy n(k) , λx ∈ K which means that, for large enough k, λy n(k) , λx ∈ B q n(k) , p n(k) , w; K and, hence W h (x n(k) ) ≥ W h (λx)), which is impossible.
Theorem 1 Under Conditions 1 -4, there exists a competitive equilibrium.
Proof Assume, without loss of generality, that V has full column rank. Fix n ∈ N, and let
be the aggregate truncated demand correspondence, defined by F (q, p; n) = h∈H f h q, p; K h n . Then F (·; n) is nonempty-, compact-, convex-valued and upper hemicontinuous at each (q, p) ∈ R A × R (S+1)(L+1) + , q = 0 and p s = 0 for all s. Also, if (y
and Φ 2 are nonempty-, compact-, convex-valued and upper hemicontinuous and, by Lemma 1, Φ 3 has the same properties. Therefore, Φ is nonempty-, compact-, convex-valued and upper hemicontinuous. By Kakutani's fixed-point theorem, there exists (q * , p * , y * , z * ) ∈ Φ(q * , p * , y * , z * ) (in particular, q * · y * = 0). We first note that V y * ≤ 0. Suppose that v s · y * > 0; then, using Condition 3, let q = (q * + v s ) ∈ R A+1 + \ {(0, ..., 0)}, which implies that for some λ > 0, λq ∈ Q and λq · y * = λ (q * + v s ) · y * = λv s · y * > 0 in contradiction with the fact that q * ∈ arg max q ∈Q {q · y * } . , then
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Now, for each n ∈ N, let (q * n , p * n , y * n , z * n ) be a fixed point, and let
By the above boundedness of x * h n ∞ n=1
and the compactness of Q and S+1 , there exists a subsequence such that q *
Suppose that for some s, p * s,0 = 0. By Condition 4, there is an agent h such that for every ε > 0,
), so, by continuity, for large k,
which contradicts the fact that y * h
. It follows that p * s,0 > 0 and, since V has full rank, we can define y * h as the unique solution to
Now, for large n, y * h , x * h is interior to K h n , and by continuity and quasiconcavity of W h , y * h , x * h is maximal in B (q * , p * ) . Also, q · y * = 0 and V y * ≤ 0. Now, suppose y * = 0; then, V (−y * ) ≥ 0 and there is s ∈ S such that v s (−y * ) > 0; by Condition 4, ∃h ∈ H such that
We consider the case in which each agent's utility function has a von NeumannMorgenstern expected utility representation, but in which agents may disagree on zero-probability events. We carry on the assumption that even if agents assign probability zero to a particular event, they do not plan to go bankrupt on that event.
Condition 5 For each h, W
h can be written as
is agent h probability distribution (i.e., beliefs) over S, u h s is continuous, concave.
Condition 6 For each s ∈ S, there exists an h ∈ H such that, for all x ∈ R (S+1)(L+1) + and ε > 0, u
Theorem 2 Under Conditions 2, 3, 5 and 6, there is a 4-tuple of asset prices, commodity prices, asset allocations and commodity allocations (q
such that:
1. For all h ∈ H, (y * h , x * h ) ∈ arg max (y,x)∈B h (q * ,p * ) W h and moreover, for every s,
Notice that Conditions 5 and 6 allow for beliefs to be completely different. In particular, we do not require them to be equivalent in the sense that for all h, j ∈ H, π h (s) = 0 ⇔ π j (s) = 0. It follows that equivalence of beliefs is not a necessary condition for existence of equilibrium in a two-period economy with no bankruptcy. Also, the theorem requires that (p * s , x * s ) be a spot market competitive equilibrium in state s. While this is obvious for states to which all households attach nonzero probability, it has to be argued independently when that is not the case.
Proof Assume, without loss of generality, that V has full column rank.
For each n ∈ N, define the probability measures π ). Let y n = arg min { y − y : y · q n = 0}. Then by the Theorem of the Maximum, since
